Abstract: We estimate the impact of a large anti-poverty cash transfer program, the Uruguayan PANES, on political support for the government that implemented it. Using the discontinuity in program assignment based on a pre-treatment eligibility score, we find that beneficiary households are 11 to 14 percentage points more likely to favor the current government relative to the previous government. Political support effects persist after the program ends. A calibration exercise indicates that these persistent impacts are consistent with a model of rational but poorly informed voters learning about politicians' redistributive preferences
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This paper analyzes the effect of a large anti-poverty program, the Uruguayan Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES), on expressed political preferences. We exploit the quasi-random assignment to the program based on a sharp discontinuity in an underlying eligibility score in order to identify the effect of receiving a government transfer on support for the incumbent government, and to ultimately advance our theoretical understanding of voter decision-making.
The interaction between government policies and voters' choices is central to debates in political economy, social choice and public economics, and an extensive literature documents how voters reward incumbents for desirable outcomes of government policies. The notion that voters respond to policy outcomes underpins the theory of democracy, by creating a mechanism for government accountability. Since the work of Kramer (1971) , Stigler (1973) , Fair (1978) and Fiorina (1981) , many scholars have studied voters' responsiveness to macroeconomic conditions and policies. A robust empirical finding in many countries is that economic conditions around election time have predictive power for the incumbent's re-election success. This observation underpins the theory of political business cycles, namely that incumbents seeking re-election can strategically manipulate the economy via expansionary fiscal policies to win votes, a claim that squares well with the observation that pre-election periods are indeed characterized by higher government spending and public goods provision (see Hibbs, 2006 for a review). Yet the existing empirical work faces obvious econometric concerns, as it typically relies on aggregate data with few observations, and most importantly, rarely relies on exogenous sources of policy variation.
Even less is known about the effect of household specific economic conditions, and in particular targeted government transfers, on the evolution of voter preferences. While it is conventional political wisdom that targeted government programs sway votes, and thus could be used strategically by incumbents seeking re-election, there is still little convincing evidence on the magnitude of these effects. Just as importantly, little is known about the mechanisms that underpin the exchange of votes for transfers between voters and politicians. The secrecy of the ballot in modern democracies makes "vote-swaying" through targeted government transfers impossible to enforce due to intertemporal commitment problems.
Inherent empirical difficulties have limited progress in identifying the impact of targeted transfers on political preferences. Both observational studies (Markus, 1988) , and the few studies that seriously attempt to tackle causality issues (Levitt and Snyder, 1997 , Elinder et al., 2008 , Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches, 2009 ) suggest that personal economic conditions affect voting behavior, although some of this evidence is contested (Green, 2006a) . 1 Beyond immediate concerns about the existence of suitable individual level data combining political preferences with government transfer receipt, omitted variables and reverse causality are likely. For instance, if targeting political "core supporters" is more effective, as predicted by some pre-electoral competition models (Lindbek and Weibull, 1987 , Cox and McCubbins, 1984 , Verdier and Snyder, 2002 , one might find a spurious positive correlation between transfer receipt and political support that does not constitute a causal effect of the former on the latter, as parties make tactical decisions about which groups will respond most to transfers. A related difficulty arises if certain social groups, such as the poor, are more likely to benefit from transfers while at the same time displaying partisan political preferences, in particular for left-wing parties that favor redistribution.
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While the empirical claim that voters respond retrospectively to macroeconomic conditions and government transfers is largely accepted, despite the econometric concerns described above, considerable disagreement also exists on the interpretation of these patterns, including the true causal magnitudes, and their implications for theories of voter preference
formation. An early model of voter decision-making based on naïve "adaptive retrospection" fits the data and can in principle generate a political business cycle (Nordhaus, 1975) , but it suffers from logical weaknesses: if voters respond adaptively, strategic governments can systematically "fool" voters by adopting expansionary policies on the eve of re-election. Yet aware of 1 Levitt and Snyder (1997) study the effect of spending at the district level on voting behavior in U.S. House of Representatives elections. They instrument spending in each district with spending in neighboring districts within the same state, and find a positive effect of non-transfer federal spending on the incumbent's vote share, but surprisingly no effect of transfer spending. A possible concern with their IV strategy is a violation of the exclusion restriction, for instance, if spending on roads or military bases in nearby districts directly affects voters' choices. Sole-Olle and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) use a similar approach and estimate positive impacts of government spending on incumbent support in Spain. Chen (2008a Chen ( , 2008b estimates the impact of transfers on voting in the U.S. Chen uses aggregated voting data and relies on the quasi-random path of hurricanes to predict federal transfers. Green (2006a) uses the discontinuity in assignment to Progresa across Mexican communities to estimate voting impacts, and finds a slightly larger incumbent vote share in treated communities but this pattern is also present before the program, suggesting endogenous political selection of beneficiaries rather than a causal impact. 2 A related literature explores the implications of voters' political ideology on political parties' transfer choices. Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) find support for the swing voter model using the introduction of discretionary funds in Sweden, while others find evidence of core voters being targeted (Case, 2001 , Schady, 2000 , Green 2006b ). There is also evidence of direct vote buying in Latin America, including Schaffer (2007) and Stokes (2005) . In recent work Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches (2009) using -similarly to us -a regression discontinuity design find large and robust effects of targeted transfers in the form of vouchers for computer purchase on support for the government.
politicians' distorted incentives, rational voters should dismiss such policies as inconsequential to their welfare, eliminating politicians' strategic incentive to engage in expansionary policies.
Springing from the 1980s rational expectation revolution, several scholars have shown how political business cycles can arise even in the presence of "rational" voting. In this view, past economic performance matters to rational voters to the extent they help predict future outcomes. While some versions simply rely of wage stickiness and output surprises to produce booms and busts around election times (e.g. Alesina et al., 1993) , micro-founded theories of rational business cycle embedded in models of asymmetric information and politician career concerns (like Ferejohn, 1986 , Rogoff, 1990 , Persson and Tabellini, 2002 chapter 3) suggest in particular that incumbents use expansionary policies to signal their quality or competence to voters. In a world with asymmetric information about incumbent competence, good macroeconomic performance serves a useful signaling role, and, as in the literature on CEO compensation (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) , elections provide high powered incentives for politicians with career concerns to exert greater effort. In such models, retrospective voting is fully consistent with rational forward-looking voter decision-making.
A related but distinct rationale also relying on asymmetric information between politicians and voters has been invoked to explain why targeted transfers might affect rational voters' choices: government transfers could act as a signal to imperfectly informed citizens about incumbents' preferences for different socio-demographic groups. In this spirit, Drazen and Eslava (2006) develop a formal model where it is rational for voters targeted by government transfers to have stronger political preferences for the incumbent, as they presumably learn that their population subgroup is also more likely to be favored by that party again in the future.
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The assertion that voters are fully rational, in the sense that they gather and process all relevant information to maximize expected future outcomes when making their political choices, is arguably a blunt view of reality, especially in light of the growing body of empirical evidence from psychology and economics demonstrating more complex individual motivations (DellaVigna, 2009) . Some empirical evidence in political economy also increasingly leans against the textbook models of perfectly rational retrospective voters discussed above. Alesina et al. (1993) reject the rational retrospection model using data on U.S. presidential elections in the context of a structural model, and Wolfers (2009) shows that U.S. voters are only partially able to extract a signal of incumbent ability based on local economic outcomes. That voters are unable to perfectly assess government policies and politician competence is similarly attested to by their tendency to punish incumbents for natural disasters (Cole et al., 2008) and even shark attacks (Achen and Bartels, 2004) . The issues of reciprocity, fairness and gratitude (Rabin, 1993 , Cox et al., 2007 that have been shown to be empirically relevant in real-world labor market situations (Gneezy and List, 2006, Kube et al., 2007) could plausibly also play a role in the evolution of voters' political decision making and asked a series of questions including their support for the current government, and a second similar follow-up survey took place the following year. Because assignment to the program near the threshold was nearly "as good as random", we are able to circumvent the problems of reverse causality, endogenous political selection, and omitted variables highlighted above to more reliably estimate the impact of transfers on political preferences.
To preview our main findings, program beneficiaries are much more likely to support the incumbent than non-beneficiaries, by 11 to 14 percentage points, and these effects are statistically significant at high levels of confidence and pass numerous regression discontinuity validity checks. Uruguay has highly developed democratic political institutions for a middleincome country, suggesting that some of the political findings could also be relevant for wealthier countries. In a novel twist that helps us understand voter motivations and overcome certain misreporting concerns, we also use post-program survey data to show that the positive impacts on support for the incumbent persist even in the year after the program ended.
We next adapt a formal model of rational but poorly informed voters learning about politicians' redistributive preferences to assess whether this framework can rationalize the main empirical patterns, and in particular account for the persistent impacts on political support into the post-program period. An empirical exercise indicates that the estimated impacts on political support for the government due to the transfer program, and, importantly, the persistence of these effects into the year after the program ends, can in fact be reconciled with this model. Though we cannot definitively disentangle this rational learning model from behavioral explanations relying on reciprocity, and both plausibly play a role in driving our findings, this exercise indicates that a standard political economy framework can in fact go a long way towards rationalizing voter decision-making.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents details of the PANES program and the data. Section II investigates the effect of the transfer program on political support for the government, and section III presents a formal model of voter learning about politician redistributive preferences and fits it to the program data, providing insights into the channels behind the increase in political support. The final section concludes.
I. THE PANES PROGRAM IN URUGUAY
Uruguay is a small Latin American country, home to 3.3 million individuals, half of whom live in the capital of Montevideo. The country experienced rapid economic growth in the first decades of the twentieth century, and was among the first countries in the region to complete the demographic transition, implement universal primary education, and establish a generous old age pension system. Although economic growth stagnated in the second half of the century, Uruguay is still among the most developed Latin American countries according to the UNDP Human Development Index, with strong life expectancy and schooling indicators (Supplementary   Appendix Table A1 ). Currently, PPP-adjusted annual per capita income is just below US$10,000. According to The Economist Intelligence Unit, the country's political system has low levels of corruption and free and fair elections. To determine program assignment, the government used a predicted income score that depended only on household socioeconomic characteristics collected in the baseline survey, not 6 One should be cautious in interpreting this figure as some households might have perceived an incentive to underreport baseline income. As noted below, self-reported baseline income is not used in the predicted income score that determined PANES program eligibility. 7 Nearly 85% of applicant households had at least one child and/or a pregnant woman. However, this component of the program took same time to be implemented due to logistical difficulties. This explains why by the beginning of 2007 only around 70% of beneficiary households report having received a food card. 8 The transfer program continued alongside a system of family allowances that had been in place since 2004. Both PANES eligible and ineligible households maintained access to that program, which was much less generous.
directly on self-reported reported income itself. The income score was devised by researchers at the University of the Republic (Universidad de la República), including one of the authors of this paper (Arim et al., 2005) , and was based on a probit model of the likelihood of being below a critical per capita income level, using a highly saturated function of household variables. The underlying model was estimated using the 2004 National Household Survey (Encuesta Continua de Hogares). The resulting coefficient estimates were then used to predict an income score for each applicant household using PANES baseline survey data. 9 Only households with predicted income scores below a predetermined threshold were assigned to program treatment.
The choice of using predicted income rather than actual reported income was driven by a number of factors. First, many households had highly unstable income during the crisis, so current income was seen as a bad proxy for permanent income, and thus less likely to target the chronically poor. Second, because the target population often worked in the informal sector, it was difficult to verify their reported income levels against official social security records, opening up the risk of misreporting. By using a wide array of socioeconomic characteristics in the income score, as opposed to self-reported income, the government hoped to minimize strategic misreporting.
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This discontinuous rule for program assignment was suggested to Ministry officials by the authors of this paper with the explicit goal of carrying out the prospective evaluation of PANES. Government officials proved remarkably receptive to the proposal and were uninvolved in the design and calculation of the eligibility score, which was computed with the assistance of bureaucrats at the Social Security Administration (Banco de Previsión Social) . Similarly, neither the enumerators nor households were ever informed about the exact variables that entered into the score, the weights attached to them, or the program eligibility threshold, easing concerns 9 Variables used to predict income included: the type of household (head only; head and spouse; head and children; head, spouse and children only; with non-relatives, with relatives other than head, spouse or children), an indicator for public employees in the household, an indicator for pensioners in the household, average years of education of individuals over age 18 and its square, interactions of age indicators (0-5, 6-17, 18-24, 25-39, 40-54, 45-64, 65 and over) with gender, indicators for household head age, residential overcrowding, whether the household was renting, toilet facilities (no toilet, flush toilet, pit latrine, other) and a wealth index based on durables ownership (e.g., refrigerator, TV, car, etc.). The weights attached to the observed covariates to determine the predicted income score differed between Montevideo and the rest of the country. The eligibility thresholds were also allowed to vary slightly across the country's five main administrative regions to entitle similar numbers of poor households in each area of the program. The regions are: Montevideo, North (Artigas, Salto, Rivera), Center-North (Paysandú, Río Negro, Tacuarembó, Durazno, Treinta y Tres, Cerro Largo), Center-South (Soriano, Florida, Flores, Lavalleja, Rocha) and South (Colonia, San José, Canelones, Maldonado). 10 Martinelli and Parker (2009) discuss the risks of under-and over-reporting of assets in the context of a similar anti-poverty program eligibility score in Mexico.
about manipulation of the score and also making the program assignment process somewhat opaque to both enumerators and applicants. 11 Moreover, the score was developed in AugustSeptember 2005, months after the baseline survey was collected from households in our sample, the timing making it impossible for enumerators or households to know exactly how to manipulate surveys for a formula that did not yet exist. The eligibility score components and weights were eventually made public on the MIDES website after the program ended. 12 The program was fully rolled out within a year of its launch in April 2005. On an annual basis, the total cost of the program was 0.41% of GDP and 1.95% of government social expenditures. The program was entirely financed through Uruguayan government revenue.
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The PANES program was designed to be temporary ending in December 2007 (see Figure   1 ). In January 2008, PANES was replaced by a new transfer program, the Plan de Equidad (PE).
PE was part of a broader tax and social program reform, and also included a generous cash transfer for poor households with children, with an average PE monthly transfer of UY$1,300
(US$67 at the January 2008 real exchange rate), nearly the PANES level. A revised predicted income score was computed for all original PANES applicant households (whether beneficiaries or not) based on the same baseline characteristics measured in 2005, but using a new formula, and also featured a different threshold score. Households did not need to reapply for the PE, as inclusion was automatic among eligible households. PANES households were informed by mail of the program's end date in late 2007, and both PANES and non-PANES households who were 11 A relatively small number of households (7,946) were included in the program before August 2005, before the predicted income score was even constructed, but were later removed if their score exceeded the eligibility threshold. An additional 2,552 homeless households were included in the program irrespective of their income score. The score was slightly modified in September 2005 when MIDES realized that few one person households would receive program assistance, and the new formula (which we use) applied from that point forward. There was an additional participation condition that in practice disqualified around 10% of applicants: only households with actual monthly per capita income below UY$1,300, excluding pension earnings and child benefits, were administered the baseline survey and could thus apply for. Household income for eligibility purposes was computed as the maximum of self-reported income and earnings reported in official social security records. Hence, the predicted income score was not even computed for households with income exceeding that threshold. All participating households were informed of this rule before applying. Beneficiary households whose social security earnings later exceeded the UY$1,300 threshold eventually lost eligibility. 12 Program participation was also technically contingent on school attendance of all children under age 14 years and regular health checkups for all children and pregnant women, as in many other Latin American conditional cash transfer programs (e.g., Mexico's Progresa/Oportunidades). However, due to lack of monitoring capacity, the program was unconditional de facto, a fact publicly acknowledged by MIDES after the end of the program, and there is no record of any household losing PANES benefits for failing to meet these criteria. Despite non-enforcement of the conditionalities, most beneficiaries were aware of their existence: 56% of beneficiary households report knowing of at least one program conditionality. Republic. The University departments were also in charge of data collection. To exploit the discontinuity design, the original survey sample contained data on approximately 3,000
households, including both eligible and ineligible applicants, in the neighborhood of the program eligibility threshold score (households with a predicted probability of being below the target income level within two percentage points of the cutoff eligibility score). There was a desire to over-represent eligible households, leading the sample to be split between eligible and ineligible households in a 2:1 ratio.
for the current government. These criteria disqualified around 1,100 households. 15 Overall, the analysis sample contains complete data on the remaining 1,942 households.
In addition to information on housing, household composition, durables, work, income and schooling, the survey collected information on health, economic expectations, knowledge of political rights, participation in social groups, opinions about the PANES program, and political attitudes, including support for the government, our key outcome variable.
A second follow-up household survey round was collected in February and March 2008, three months after PANES had ended and had been replaced by the PE (Figure 1 ). It was similar to the first follow-up survey, with the addition of several questions on respondents' social and political attitudes, for instance, a question on respondents' national pride as a Uruguayan.
Attrition across follow-up rounds is a minor concern, as 92% of households from the first followup round were successfully re-surveyed in the second follow-up, and was balanced across PANES and non-PANES households. A linear polynomial on each side of the discontinuity is also fit to the data.
I.d Program implementation
The figure demonstrates that program implementation was remarkably clean. Among applicants, practically all potential beneficiaries -i.e., those with a standardized predicted 15 These excluded households were used in an earlier version of this paper, and the main political support impacts and statistical significance levels remain unchanged (not shown). 16 Official Uruguayan government documents report these graphs on a reverse horizontal axis, i.e., with a predicted "poverty score". Obviously, this is only a presentational issue and makes no difference to the estimates.
income score below zero -benefited from the program. The opposite holds for ineligible households, and the discontinuity in program receipt at the threshold is 99 percentage points.
This implies that enforcement of the rule was nearly as strict as implied by the letter of the law.
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Although the program included a variety of components, we do not attempt to disentangle what roles these different elements played in shaping outcomes since there was potentially nonrandom selection into some of them. We concentrate instead on the overall effect of program participation at the threshold, which for the vast majority of beneficiary households consisted solely of the monthly income transfer and the food card.
II. RESULTS
We use the two follow-up surveys, together with the baseline survey (and the Latinobarómetro public opinion surveys in some cases) to explore PANES program effects on political support for the FA government, the main outcome of interest. We first present average treatment effects (in Table 1 ), then test the validity of our identification assumption, namely that assignment around the eligibility threshold was nearly "as good as random", as envisioned in the prospective evaluation design (Table 2) . A concern is manipulation of program assignment by either officials or enumerators, due to strategic responses or a correlation between survey non-response and political views. We also begin to highlight the channels through which PANES affects attitudes by investigating post-program income and participation in other programs (Table 3) .
II.a. Impacts on political support for the government
We use the following question from the follow-up survey to measure support for the incumbent government: "In relation to the previous government, do you believe that the current government is worse (0), the same (1/2), better (1)?".
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Figure 3 presents support for the government as a function of the normalized predicted income score. The discontinuity at zero provides an estimate of the proportion of individuals 17 Self-reported information from the follow-up surveys is highly correlated with official records. Self-reports indicate that 97% of beneficiary households report having participated in the program and only 7% of non-eligible households report ever having participated, for a discontinuity at the threshold of over 90% (compared to a discontinuity of 99% using official administrative records).. 18 The questionnaire presents responses in the following order "1: the same, 2: worse, 3: better. Supplementary Appendix Table A2 provides exact wording (translated) and codes for this question and the other main survey questions included in the analysis. We also combined responses into a simple indicator for responding that the current government is strictly "better" than the opposition and get nearly identical results (not shown).
who support the current government in the PANES eligible group versus the ineligible. PANES households are significantly more pro-government: among eligible households support for the current government is around 91%, compared to 77% for ineligible households (still a high level of support, as might be expected since the left-wing coalition is widely supported by the poor).
The estimated discontinuity implies that program eligibility is associated with a 14 percentage point increase in support for the government over the opposition coalition. This provides evidence that households' political views are responsive to government transfers.
The outcome measure we use merits further discussion. One concern is that the question refers to preferences for the incumbent relative to the previous government, not to the current opposition coalition, hence not allowing for any policy repositioning by the opposition. The framing of the question may also fail to accommodate expectations about government performance going forward. Actual voting data at the individual level would be the ideal outcome, but is typically impossible to collect in democracies given the secret ballot. Moreover, no national elections were held in Uruguay during the 2005-2008 period. A second best alternative is survey voting intentions, although these were not collected in either the baseline or follow-up surveys, since MIDES feared this would appear inappropriate.
To circumvent these difficulties, we examine several other useful measures of political attitudes contained in our surveys, including a question in the 2008 follow-up on "confidence in the President" (coded 0="Little" 1/2="Some confidence", 1="A lot"). The estimated discontinuity in this variable at the threshold is similar to the impact on FA support, at 9
percentage points, and is highly statistically significant (section III.c below contains further discussion). We included this "confidence in the President" question in the survey in part because a question with the exact same wording is included in nationally representative To refine the analysis, we next present regression results to explore robustness to different parametric specifications and the inclusion of baseline control variables. Let S i be the predicted income score for household i (where a higher score denotes higher predicted income)
and let E denote the eligibility threshold, such that in principle only households with scores below E are eligible for treatment. Let N i =S i -E be the normalized income score. Following Card and Lee (2008), we regress a variable of interest (here being a PANES beneficiary) for household i, y i , on a constant, an indicator for households below the threshold 1(N i <0), and two parametric polynomials in the normalized score (f 1 (N i ) and f 2 (N i )), on each side of the threshold, such that
(1)
The impact of program assignment is captured by β 1 , i.e., the change in y at the eligibility threshold. The two fitted plots in Figures 2 and 3 (and subsequent figures) are obtained by letting f 1 (.) and f 2 (.) be linear, though in the regressions we also allow for quadratic functions.
The top panel of Table 1 reports first-stage regression discontinuity (RD) estimates of equation (1) with an indicator for ever being a PANES beneficiary household as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 3 present specifications with different parameterizations of the functions f 1 (.) and f 2 (.): no polynomial, a first order polynomial (as in Figure 2) , and a quadratic polynomial, respectively. The first stage is strong and estimates vary minimally, between 0.98 and 0.99 across specifications, including those that also control for a variety of baseline household controls (columns 4-6).
The second panel of Figure 4 . The program we study thus had persistent impacts on political support for the government, suggesting that past transfers also factor meaningfully into voters' decision-making.
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II.b Potential threats to the validity of the RD estimates
One potential concern with the results in Table 1 is the possibility that assignment to PANES somehow favored households with higher underlying support for the governing Frente Amplio (FA) party. Evidence on manipulation of a program eligibility score in a recent Colombian health insurance program (Conover and Camacho, 2007) suggests that this is far from a remote possibility. Unfortunately, we lack data on baseline household political orientation, which prevents us from directly testing this alternative hypothesis; however, a variety of evidence makes it appear implausible.
First off, the evidence in Figure 2 that virtually all eligible households received the program while nearly all ineligible households did not, suggests that blatant patronage is unlikely to have occurred. An alternative possibility is that the variables recorded in the baseline survey, 20 This effect is mainly driven by a shift among beneficiaries from indifference between the two parties to support for the government, although there is also a small reduction in expressed support for the opposition (not shown). 21 In results not shown, we find that expressed political support for the government is highly persistent at the household level across the two follow-up survey rounds. To check whether the discontinuity at the true cut-off provides the best fit for the data, we have run 30 additional RD regressions using the political support variable (in specifications like that in Table 1 column 2), where we "incorrectly" set the threshold at equally spaced intervals around the true eligibility threshold (ranging from -0.015 to 0.015, where the true threshold is zero). The true eligibility threshold provides the best fit to the data as measured by the regression R 2 (not shown), providing reassurance that the discontinuity we exploit is a genuine feature of the data. As an additional robustness check, we take advantage of the fact that the PANES eligibility threshold differs slightly across Uruguayan regions to estimate a difference-in-differences model, conditioning on the un-standardized income score and regional fixed effects and focusing on the coefficient estimate on an indicator for PANES eligibility (in that region). Political support impacts are statistically significant at 95% confidence and are remarkably similar to those in Table 1 (not shown). 22 In further analysis not presented here, we explored the possibility of heterogeneous treatment among different population subgroups. While older individuals and those living in Montevideo are marginally less responsive to the transfer in some specifications, these effects are generally not statistically significant (results not shown). In an earlier version of this paper (Manacorda et al, 2009) we also found significantly larger PANES impacts among households with lower baseline self-reported income, and for households predicted to be politically moderate (fitted using Latinobarómetro data), using the 2007 survey data. However, these results are not robust to using the second 2008 follow-up, and we do not emphasize them here.
and that determined the predicted income score for PANES eligibility, were manipulated by either government officials or enumerators, or that households with closer FA ties somehow learned the formula and were thus able to answer the questionnaire strategically to gain eligibility. However, this is essentially impossible since the formula was not yet developed until months after the baseline surveys had been collected in 2005. The predicted income score formula was also developed by outside researchers and never publicly disclosed or shared with the MIDES officials implementing PANES until after household assignment had been carried out (although the formula was of course presented to and approved by the Minister of MIDES).
As a first check for non-random assignment around the eligibility threshold, we estimate equation 1 for multiple pre-treatment covariates in Table 2 (and present the results graphically in supplementary appendix Figure A1 ). If score manipulation systematically occurred, we might find these characteristics varying discontinuously at the eligibility threshold, to the extent that they are correlated with households' political orientation. Focusing on our preferred specification with the linear fits (as in Table 1 , column 2), we fail to find evidence of a discontinuity at the threshold for any household covariate including: average household members' age and education (among those over 18), income, and for the gender, age and years of education of the survey respondent, as well as in survey non-response. Consistent with this validity check, the results in Table 1 are almost unchanged when household controls are included (columns 4-6). Similarly, there is no evidence of a difference in voter turnout in the previous national election at the eligibility threshold: self-reported turnout in the previous national election was 93% for ineligible households and 94% for the eligible (and the difference is not statistically significant), in line with the consistently high turnout in Uruguay, where voting is mandatory.
23
As an additional check for manipulation around the eligibility threshold, we present the non-parametric distribution of the standardized score. If manipulation occurred so that some ineligible households were assigned a low predicted income score, one would expect excess bunching of households just below the threshold (DiNardo and Lee, 2004; McCrary, 2008a) . Figure A2 reports the proportion of households with different score levels, for the population of households (20, 463) in the neighborhood of the threshold (-0.02 to 0.02). Following McCrary (2008a) we augment this graph with a local linear estimator of the 23 Voting is mandatory in Uruguay and citizens who fail to vote (other than for justified reasons, i.e., hospitalization) are officially barred from receiving public benefits and transfers, enrolling in public education, accessing public employment or leaving the country, unless they pay a non-trivial fine. density function on either side of the threshold. There is no indication of households just below the eligibility threshold being overrepresented relative to those just ineligible. 24 Manipulation of the eligibility score does not appear responsible for the effects in Table 1 .
Supplementary appendix
Another concern is that non-response rates for the survey overall, or on the political questions, were systematically related to program eligibility. This could be a concern even though non-respondents were in practice replaced by households with a similar predicted income score, if unobservables differ for non-responding households. In Table 2 we report the relationship between survey non-response and PANES eligibility among households in the original sample as well as the probability of being a replacement household in the final analysis sample, and neither coefficient estimate is statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. We also do not find a significant relationship between survey non-response and baseline log household income, or with income interacted with PANES eligibility (not shown), further evidence that differential attrition as a function of program eligibility is not a leading concern.
A final concern is that PANES households might have expressed higher support for the government in the follow-up survey for fear of losing their benefits. This is unlikely given the degree of institutional transparency and relative lack of corruption in Uruguay, but precautions were taken to address this concern during data collection, nonetheless. Households were not informed about the precise objectives of the follow-up survey: both the title of the survey and information provided to respondents only referred to the University departments administering the survey and neither made specific mention of PANES or MIDES. 25 Questions about the PANES program were only asked at the very end of the questionnaire and after the questions on political views. Both follow-up survey questionnaires were modeled after the National Household Survey, further easing concerns that respondents would associate the survey with
PANES. A final piece of evidence against strategic responses to the political questions is the fact that stated support for the government among PANES households remains higher in 2008 even
after PANES had ended. 24 The point estimate of the log difference at the threshold in Figure 3 is just 0.041 (s.e. 0.027). 25 The wording used by enumerators in the consent statement was: "Good morning/afternoon, my name is ___ and I'm a student at the University of the Republic. We are currently in this neighborhood carrying out a survey of families who live here. Your name and address were randomly chosen from a list of neighbors (provided by the National Statistics Bureau). Could I ask you a few questions? I remind you that all information that you give me is confidential (Statistics Secret Law #16.016) and will only be used for statistical purposes." (authors' translation).
II.c. Greater support among recipients -or bitterness among non-recipients?
A remaining issue is one of interpretation, namely whether the estimated PANES impacts are due not only to treated households being more supportive of the government, but whether the ineligible are also bitter at their exclusion from the program, in which case the estimates are a combination of two distinct effects. The growing field evidence on the power of negative reciprocity in driving labor effort and other economically relevant behaviors (surveyed in DellaVigna, 2009) suggests this is potentially important. A finding that those who barely lost out on receiving the PANES transfer have lower political support due to bitterness is not a threat to our overall strategy, though, since the RD design still allows us to test our overarching empirical hypothesis, namely, that differential transfer receipt due to PANES at the eligibility score threshold significantly impacts political support. However, it would have implications for understanding the net support the FA gained or lost among those households near the threshold.
Although there is no direct way to measure these effects, we provide suggestive evidence that any embitterment effect is unlikely to be large, and that most of the support difference we estimate is due to gains among PANES beneficiaries. We use the Latinobarómetro opinion data to predict household support for the President. As in the second follow-up survey of were personally better off under the current government than the previous one. However, the notion that there were persistent gains in living standards is not borne out in the data. We first report impacts on log per capita household income in the two follow-up surveys (Table 3, rows 1 and 2), in our preferred specification with linear polynomial controls. 
0.020).
The experiences of PANES beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries had a major impact on their perceptions of both the PANES and PE programs (Table 3) . PANES beneficiaries have a far more positive opinion about the PANES program, with support increasing from 58% among nonbeneficiaries up to 84% among beneficiaries, and this effect is highly significant. Similarly, while households on both sides of the eligibility threshold have serious doubts about the fairness of PANES targeting -with large majorities believing that some beneficiaries should not have received the transfers, that some non-beneficiaries should have, and that the program should have spread around transfers to additional households -these critical views are significantly less pronounced among PANES beneficiaries, clear evidence of self-serving beliefs. Former PANES beneficiaries also appear more knowledgeable about and supportive of the new PE transfers. 28 The estimated income gains in 2007 (UY$452) among PANES beneficiaries are smaller than the transfer amount (UY$1,360) suggesting some offsetting behavioral responses in terms of reduced labor income from other sources, although note that impacts on hours of labor supply are not statistically significant (not shown). While the income transfer alone might have depressed household labor supply due to an income effect or due to the program being means tested, other PANES components (e.g., education and training and public works employment) likely acted in the opposite direction, and these two effects appear to have roughly cancelled, leading to no discernible program effect on work hours. This limited adult labor supply response is consistent with results from Mexico's Progresa program (Parker and Skoufias, 2000) . We also find only modest positive effects of the program on current school enrollment (for children aged 7-18) and medical visits in the last three months (for children aged 0-6 and women of childbearing age, 14-35), not shown, perhaps due to the conditions officially attached to program receipt, which may have swayed some households even though they were never enforced. However, there is no evidence of impacts on durables ownership, home characteristics or self-reported health (see Amarante et al., 2008) . Although there is no detailed consumption or savings information in the survey, PANES households claim to have spent the transfer primarily on food and clothes (71%), to pay utility bills (10%) and to repay debts or loans (10%).
The main takeaway message from this subsection is that a simple model where The framework we develop, which is related to Drazen and Eslava (2006) , assumes asymmetric information between voters and politicians, with imperfect knowledge of politicians' true redistributive preferences across population subgroups, i.e., those of different social classes, different regions, by gender, education, and disability, etc. Politician campaign promises are a form of cheap talk in the absence of a binding commitment technology, leaving room for uncertainty about these preferences, and thus noisy priors before the FA came into power. Voters then learn about politician preferences by observing the targeting of their social group in actual government programs, and update beliefs about politician redistributive preferences according to a standard Bayesian approach.
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The assumption that voters also have poor information about the PANES targeting criteria is also critical in what follows. Individuals fully informed about the PANES targeting rule, who also knew their own predicted income score lay just to the right of the eligibility score threshold, should rationally deduce that their chance of receiving a future government program is effectively the same as a household located just to the left of the threshold. This would lead expected future transfers to be equal for both groups of households, and thus no meaningful difference in political support looking forward. However, these assumptions about voters'
program knowledge seem unrealistic in this context. In the case of PANES, the opacity of the program targeting rule, which was not publicly released until the end of the program, means that the observed targeting of the program delivers only an imperfect signal about government preferences. This is true even for households, like those in our analysis, who lie near the program eligibility score threshold (for whom the program inclusion criteria might appear particularly unclear). Note that households were never provided with their predicted income score (the variable used internally for program assignment) and thus do not even know whether they were "close" to the threshold or not. It is also unrealistic for them to derive the formula on their own through personal observation (of themselves and other households in their social circle, say)
given the many different household factors that entered into the predicted income model.
We begin by describing politicians' preferences in the model. The government in power has true preferences over net transfers to socio-demographic subgroup i denoted γ i . The transfers to each group in an actual government transfer program in period t, g it , yields a noisy signal of this underlying preference parameter: g it = γ i + µ it where voters' prior belief on the preference parameter is distributed γ i0 ∼ N(γ i , σ 0 2 ), and µ it ∼ N(0 , 1). The assumption that 1/σ 0 < 1 implies that prior beliefs are less informative than actual policies in capturing true politician preferences, perhaps due to the cheap talk problem alluded to above.
Bayesian updating by voters implies that voters' expected future transfer after t signals from actual government programs is:
where E t [g i,t+1 ] captures expected future transfers at time t+1. Given the uncertainty in government targeting criteria and preferences, and voters' only partial information on program design, we assume below that voters use the transfer they personally receive as the signal of government redistributive preferences towards people "like them". Thus while voters are perfectly rational and use standard Bayesian updating, we assume they are operating in an environment with limited information on politician intentions and program implementation.
Expected voter utility from supporting a particular political party is a function of many factors, including voter ideology and a range of time-varying policies beyond transfers. In particular, voter expected utility from supporting the Frente Amplio is:
where overall population support for the FA in period t is captured by π FA,t , the impact of future expected transfers targeted to group i is bE t [g i,t+1 ], and ε it denotes an idiosyncratic determinant of individual support for the FA, for instance from individual political ideology or other life circumstances, and is assumed to be distributed extreme value to allow for the use of the logit model. For simplicity, expected utility from supporting the opposition in period t is V OP,it = π OP,t .
We assume individuals vote sincerely, and also sincerely express their voting intentions on our surveys, convenient assumptions in political economy empirical work. Voter i supports the FA when V FA,it > V OP,it , or equivalently a t + bE t [g i,t+1 ] > ε it , where a t = π FA,t -π OP,t . The logit solution, where the probability of supporting the FA government (opposition) is P FA,it (P OP,it ), is:
The empirical calibration is straightforward. We consider three time periods, where t=0 corresponds to the pre-PANES period, t=1 corresponds to the 2007 survey round (when PANES was still ongoing) and t=2 is the 2008 follow-up (when PANES had already ended). Households are assumed to receive i.i.d. signals about future government transfers in periods t=1 and t=2.
These differ across PANES and PE program beneficiaries, with the average household transfer at US$89.50 for PANES beneficiaries in t=1 and zero for non-beneficiaries (Table 4) 30 , and the average PE transfer is at US$67.00 in t=2 for both the former PANES beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries now enrolled in PE (and zero for those not in PE), although former PANES beneficiaries also continue to receive a food card valued at US$19.50 per month.
The quasi-experimental variation in the PANES transfer allows us to identify the parameter b by comparing FA support between PANES beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in 2007. The model laid out above implies that this difference in FA support is driven by differences in the transfers they expect to receive in the future, which is in turn determined by their past transfer experiences. Further assumptions are needed to pin down these expectations about future transfers and calibrate the model, most importantly on voters' prior beliefs at t=0 about the transfer they would receive from the FA and on the precision of this prior. We assume that both PANES beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries held a common prior on the government's redistributive preferences towards them, which is reasonable given the similarity of their observed characteristics and the quasi-random assignment of the program near the threshold, and we set this transfer level γ i0 to 50% of the actual PANES transfer, or US$44.75, although results do not depend on this assumption. 31 We also assume that the prior precision is 1/σ 0 2 = 0.5 as our leading case, and discuss robustness to a wider range of precisions, from 0.1 to 0.9.
To apply the binary logit framework, we group together voters who are indifferent This analysis implies that, under plausible assumptions, a model of rational but poorly informed voters learning about politician redistributive preferences can rationalize the broad patterns in the Uruguay data, and in particular the persistence of FA support gains into the post-PANES period. However, these findings do not necessarily imply that models of reciprocity from psychology and economics are not also at work in this or other related contexts. In particular, the learning model we present cannot be conclusively distinguished from a gift-exchange model 31 The reason for this is that the model parameters are identified simply based on differences in treatment and outcomes between program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. To the extent that the prior is the same for the two groups, its precise value is irrelevant for the purposes of the calibration. Table 5 ). This increased optimism about the future is consistent with the previous sub-section's model, to the extent that these individuals may be expecting greater government transfers in the future. Beneficiaries' report of greater subjective satisfaction with their own household situation is also broadly consistent with self-interested "pocketbook voting". However, the conclusion that self-interest alone is driving increased FA support is tempered by the observation that, relative to nonbeneficiaries, former PANES beneficiaries also have a more positive perception of the country's situation, both currently and for the future (gains of 0.059 and 0.055, respectively). They are also significantly less likely to have perceived increased social differences in the past year (-0.109, s.e. 0.041) . This suggests that voters overweigh their own personal experience in making sense of economic and social conditions, a possibility that has recently found widespread support in experimental economics (see Simonsohn et al., 2008 for an example). It is plausible that voters' support for a particular party is driven both by their own individual situation and economic conditions in society at large; misperceptions about the latter (for instance, the sanguine views about social inequalities among former beneficiaries) might thus also help partially explain the persistent differences in expressed FA support. This leaves the basic intuition of the model developed in the previous subsection intact, but suggests an even richer set of explanations for the persistent FA support gains among former PANES beneficiaries in 2008.
Changes in attitudes are manifested in higher support not only for the incumbent government (Table 1) , the President, and PANES itself (in Table 3 ), but also confidence in the Ministry of Social Development (0.192, s.e. 0.038, Table 5 ), which designed, and administered PANES. However, we find no significant increases in support for other institutions not directly related to PANES (for instance, Parliament, local councils) or even the social security administration that disbursed the transfers, indicating that former PANES beneficiaries are not simply casting a more optimistic eye on political institutions and organizations across the board, although point estimates tend to be positive, suggesting small positive spillovers.
There are a number of other provocative impacts of PANES receipt, including a statistically significant increase in national pride at being Uruguayan (coefficient estimate 0.046, s.e. 0.024, from an already high level of patriotic feeling, has well-developed democratic institutions and a long tradition of strong political parties, suggesting that the findings of this paper are relevant not only for Latin America but also possibly for wealthier countries with similarly capable political institutions.
Finally, we estimate a local treatment effect in this paper at the program eligibility threshold (among poor households), and thus extrapolating treatment effects to other populations, such as middle or wealthy class voters, requires stronger assumptions. We cannot rule out the possibility that the Frente Amplio government in Uruguay even lost some votes among better-off voters who had to pay for the policy though higher taxes, offsetting the political support gains we estimate among the poor; our dataset and research design do not allow us to measure any such effects. Thus while it would be interesting to compute a cost per extra vote due to PANES, we are reluctant to do so due these potentially lost votes among richer households, as well as the imperfect correspondence between stated support in a survey and actual votes.
A further caveat relates to the possibility that the PANES program caused an erosion in support among those households who just barely failed to qualify. While the presence of "sore losers" would not change our basic punch line -that differences in transfers across groups translate into different degrees of political support -and we do present suggestive evidence that leans against the "bitterness" interpretation, a government seeking re-election is obviously not indifferent about whether transfers alienate more voters than they gain.
We present a formal model of rational but poorly informed voters who use anti-poverty transfers as signals of government redistributive preferences towards them, and find that it can rationalize the broad patterns in our data, in particular the persistent post-program political support gains. In a similar framework, Drazen and Eslava (2006) show that heterogeneous politician preferences across different socio-demographic groups can generate a political economy equilibrium where parties favor certain groups and these groups in turn reward the incumbent with their votes, even if voters are fully aware of politicians' incentives to target transfers strategically to maximize their vote share.
Although our results are consistent with this model of voter learning about politician preferences, we cannot conclusively rule out the possibility that theories of reciprocity rooted in psychology and economics are also playing a role in driving the persistent political support gains for the party that implemented this large and unprecedented transfer program in Uruguay. In particular, the persistent but slightly diminished effects we estimate in the year after the PANES program had ended are also consistent with a model of voter "gratitude" that decays gradually over time. Pinpointing the role, if any, that gratitude and reciprocity play in generating persistent political support gains among transfer recipients is an important area for future research. Panels B and C, respectively) . Eligibility is an indicator for a household score below the eligibility threshold. Columns 1 to 3 include, in order, a polynomial in the standardized score of degree 0, 1 and 2, and these polynomials interacted with the eligibility indicator. Columns 4 to 6 additionally control for pretreatment characteristics of household members, log per-capita income, age, education and gender of the household head, localidad indicators and separate indicators for missing values of each of these variables. Number of observations in Panes A and C: 1,938; in panel A: 1,826. Standard errors clustered by score in brackets. Standard errors are almost identical (differing by roughly 1%) with the jackknife approach in McCrary (2008b) . Statistically significant at 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence level. 
